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Introduction
The events in Kosovo have made clear to all of us - even those of us who have been
indifferent to, or unaware of, the dramatic changes that have occurred and are
occurring on this continent in this decade - that Europe is undergoing a major
transformation. A major transformation which was engendered by the fall of the
communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the nineties and
which has liberated hidden forces in societies long oppressed in the recent past by the
totalitarian rule of the so-called socialist states.1
What are the basic constitutive elements of such a transformation? The first element
(or driving force) is the willingness and, one may say, the impatience of the majority
of the former socialist states to become integrated in the western European paradigm.
Integrated with respect to all the parameters which define the western way of life:
democratic governance, application of the rule of law, respect for civil and political
rights, market economy; but also accession to the basic European institutions, the
Council of Europe, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
The second element, which seems to conflict with the first, is a centrifugal tendency
of a number of populations in Central and Eastern Europe to secede from the states in
which they had lived throughout the communist era and to create their own homeland
- taking with them part of the territory of the old state -, or to unite with states where
their ethnic kin lives. Such a tendency has led to the emergence of a new nationalism
and irredentism, which have already brought about the dissolution of the former
USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. The ppearance of this tendency may be
attributed to what one might call the "benign" neglect by the communist regimes of
the real needs and expectations of people living in multi-ethnic, multicultural
communist states. Indeed, one can easily trace the degree of indifference that these
regimes had showed vis-à-vis ethnic populations living under their authority, as
regards power sharing, equality of treatment and opportunities and a fair distribution
                                                 
1 Concerning their integration in European institutions see, inter alia, Flauss, J-F, “Les conditions
d’admission des pays d’Europe Centrale et Orientale au sein du Conseil de l’Europe”, European
Journal of International Law, 401 et seq (1994); Gelin, E “Les critères d’admission des nouveaux Etats
indépendants au Conseil de l’Europe” Revue de Droit International et de Droit Comparé, 339 et seq
(1996).
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of wealth. The obvious discrimination that some people experienced during the
communist period at the hands of some leading political elites, usually with distinctive
ethnic characteristics, not only did not result in the extinction of the suppressed
identity of ethnically different people, but in fact transformed that identity into a
symbol, reflecting the social, political and economic resentment of the populations
discriminated against; and when a more propitious climate prevailed, the symbol of
distinct ethnicity or nationality became the banner of the quest for secession and
independence from the state which had neglected segments of its population.
The third element, which is the result of the same phenomenon that I described above,
is the emergence of strong claims for minority protection. In certain cases and for a
variety of reasons, the centrifugal tendencies have not reached, a least not as yet, the
threshold of severity dictating to certain populations their secession from a state. But,
they have been limited to a sometimes amorphous, sometimes more elaborate search
for a new equilibrium of co-existence between ethnically different populations within
the same state. In these circumstances, the long-dormant question of protection of
minorities in Europe, which had been superseded in the recent past by the
development of the protection of individual human rights in the West and by the so-
called equalitarian policy applied in the communist states, has reappeared as a major
priority. It seems that some minority populations in a number of countries are still
prepared to live together with ethnically different compatriots, provided that they start
to enjoy rights safeguarding their distinct identity, such as their distinct language,
religion and culture.
The phenomena I have briefly described give rise to new challenges for European
integration, but also new threats. Indeed the centrifugal trends which are still very
strong in certain parts of the former communist world may be seen as a natural
corollary of the process of European integration and not as a return to the
introspective policies of the 19th century. In the sense that some populations seem to
wish, before they embark on the adventure of integration, first to be freed from the
dysfunctional links of the past with people with whom they no longer feel prepared to
share the future. In other words, the acute nationalism in today’s Europe does not
necessarily contradict European unification, but may be considered as a prerequisite
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for its attainment, for those geographical areas where past geopolitical considerations
had led to counterproductive cohabitation.
On the other hand, these claims for independence, secession, or even an increased
degree of minority protection, may become a clear threat to the political stability and
the peace of Europe. The example of Yugoslavia is an illustration of how a quest for
clear solutions, based on the ideology of nationalism, may end up in the
destabilisation of a state and, ultimately, of a whole region; it also shows that the
solution of ethnic distinctiveness is not the proper antidote for dysfunctional unions.
The example of Yugoslavia indicates that Europe should search for other solutions to
satisfy the needs of those populations and ethnic groups who consider that the
amelioration of their living conditions, the attainment of their goals and the quest for
happiness are inexorably linked to the search for a separate national roof. There may
be alternative means to reach the same targets, and Europe is exploring today
alternative avenues.
Integrating Europe through the Protection of Human Rights
Let us look closely at these efforts, but also at the problems they may present.
The first antidote to the disruptive trends, which threaten stability and peace in the
former communist world, has been the reinforcement of the protection of civil and
political rights in this part of the world. Western European states, with the fervent
support of most of their Central and Eastern European interlocutors, have established
during this decade, a number of mechanisms designed to promote and to monitor
respect for human rights by « new democracies ». Obviously, these mechanisms have
not been created from scratch; they emerged out of the transformation of existing
European institutions, which were called upon to assume a new role. In a division of
labour which does not seem to be always very successful (because of the overlap that
it entails), three institutions have undertaken the task of promoting human rights in the
Eastern part of the continent : the Council of Europe, the Organisation on Security and
Co-operation in Europe and the European Court of Human Rights.
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The Council of Europe, as is well known, is the traditional political organisation,
which has as its aim the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights
throughout the territory of its member states.2 Its main work has always been - since
its inception 50 years ago - to identify the areas of discord and divergence existing in
European countries in matters of application of the democratic principles and the rule
of law, and to make efforts to streamline the basic approaches of its members with
regard to these matters, with the ultimate goal of creating a uniform model of
democracy in Europe. This goal is pursued through research into the causes of
differences, through resolutions indicating the directions to be followed by individual
states, through adoption of international conventions, in loco i vestigation of the
structural deficiencies of certain states, assistance in the adoption of new legislation,
monitoring of the progress of the newcomers with respect to their human rights
obligations and other related activities. Playing its role now in another part of the
continent has rejuvenated this Organisation, which has played an active role in the
integration of traditional Western European states into a uniform system of
democracy. It is impressive but true that, over a period of nine years, it has admitted
as members all of the former communist states, with the exception of Yugoslavia and
Belarus, and has extended its jurisdiction to areas which were hardly considered
European in the past, the most pronounced example being Georgia, which has
recently been admitted as the 41st m mber of the Council of Europe.3
The other mechanism, which has been activated in order to assist democratisation of
the newcomers, is, as mentioned above, the Organisation on Security and Co-
operation in Europe.4 This international forum has since the late eighties shifted its
priorities from bringing East and West together - something which became
superfluous after the dramatic political changes - to integrating the former socialist
                                                 
2 For a recent publication see, Conseil de l’Europe, Les Enjeux de la Grande Europe: Le Conseil de
l’Europe et la Sécurité Démocratique (Strasbourg: La Nuée Bleue, 1996).  See also Valticos. N., “La
et les droits de l’homme”, 35 Annuaire Européen, 53 et seq (1987).
3 Georgia was admitted on the 24th April 1999. There are some other states which are still waiting to be
admitted as members of the Council of Europe: one of them is Monaco, whose geographic position as a
European territory has never been questioned; while Armenia and Azerbaijan, former federal entities of
the USSR, also candidates for acession to the Council of Europe, were not considered, in the past, as
European states.
4 Decaux. E., Sicilianos, L.A. (ed), La CSCE: Dimension Humaine et Règlement des Différends(Paris:
Montchrétien, 1993); Heraclides. A., Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Human Dimension,
1972-1992 (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Sicilianos, L.A., L’ONU et la Démocratisation de l’Etat
(Paris: Pedone, 2000) particularly pp. 90 et seq. Hereinafter  OSCE.
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countries into the wider European family. Its relative advantage over the Council of
Europe is its very good knowledge of the Eastern European world in all its respects,
as a result of its previous involvement in the area. On the other hand, unlike the
Council of Europe, the OSCE had never developed activities aimed at political and
social integration, or rigid mechanisms for the protection of human rights.
The restructuring of the OSCE took place mainly during the early 90’s. The
constitutive documents upon which its new existence rests comprise, among others,
the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the
Concluding Document of the 1994 Budapest Review Conference.5 These fundamental
texts have determined the basic orientation for the newcomers regarding the
consolidation of democracy. At the same time, mechanisms monitoring the
developments in these fields have been created, with particular emphasis on the
compliance of the states with human rights commitments. It is to be noted that the
constitutive texts of the OSCE contain extensive reference to human rights and
fundamental freedoms which states are bound by internally.
The European Court of Human Rights is the judicial arm of the complex system of
protection of human rights in Europe and, in the special circumstances of its Eastern
part, an indispensable tool for the acceleration of democratisation of the states in the
area.6 Unlike its predecessor tripartite institution, it is not a flexible institution where
political considerations or conveniences may play a role.7 The Court is a rigid organ
and applies the law with equal severity regardless of whether the respondent state
comes from the West or from the East of the continent. It is, indeed, an irony of
                                                 
5 See, inter alia, Heraclides, A., op cit.
6 Recent writings on the Court (more particularly on the 11th Pro ocol) are numerous.  See, inter alia,
Drzemczewski, A., “A Major Overheaul of the European Human Rights Convention Control
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law  (Volume VI, 1997), pp. 121 et
seq., Mahoney, P. “Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights”,
Human Rights Law Journal (1999), pp. 1 et seq.
7 The tripartite institution of protection under the European Convention of Human Rights was
composed of: the European Commission of Human Rights, as the filtering organ for all interstate and
individual applications, as a semi-judicial organ; the European Court of Human Rights as the judicial
organ; and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as both an organ supervising the
execution of the judgments rendered by the Court, and an organ determining whether a violation of the
European Convention had taken place in all cases submitted to it by the European Commission for its
final determination.  This latter aspect of the procedure provided for by the European Convention
attributed a political character to its application; taking particularly into account that the great majority
of cases submitted to the European Commission had never been submitted to the European Court and
had been finally determined by the Committee of Ministers.
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history, that the more flexible, more politically oriented system which preceded the
present Court, was replaced by the latter, at a moment when a great number of states
had recently joined the system being unprepared by reason of their infrastructure to
cope with the particular exigencies of its legal rigidity. One could conclude by
studying the peculiarities of the political transition of the Central and Eastern
European states to democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, that
the tripartite system instituted in the fifties to serve comparable situations with those
existing at the end of the century, could have been more commensurate with the
demands of today’s enlarged Europe.
In any event, the European Court of Human Rights complements the two other
organisations which work for the attainment of the same goal, affording redress to
individuals for any violations of human rights protected by the European Convention
on Human Rights and contributing to the gradual harmonisation of human rights law
in the whole of Europe. We may consider that the second attribute of its jurisdiction is
more precious than the first one and more particularly in the circumstances of the
former communist states. The judgments of the Court have a direct impact upon the
law of the states parties. The way the Convention is construed by the Court constitutes
the authoritative interpretation of the rules of protection of human rights, to which
states parties must conform in order to avoid further violations of human rights and
the repercussions emanating from such violations which, in the event of serious
violations, may not be only pecuniary. Hence the Court, by its judgments, prepares the
ground for a uniform development of the content of a certain rule of human rights
protection and contributes, as a consequence, to the gradual rapprochement of the
various legal systems of Europe to the one which is what we call the «public order
of Europe.8
Apart from these three European institutions which, more or less directly, aim to
prepare the newcomers for a transition from authoritarianism to mature democratic
governance and respect for human rights, there are two other Organisations for whom
democratic development is a key factor for the admission of new member states; these
                                                 
8 See Loizidou judgment of 23 March 1995.  The European Court of Human Rights made specific
reference to the European public order, while discussing substantive or territorial restrictions to the
applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights (Series A, no 310, p.50).
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are the European Union and NATO. Although both of them are highly specialised
organisations, serving specific aspects of European co-operation and integration, both
still look at the condition of democracy as a fundamental element for the attainment of
their goals. This is particularly true of the European Union which has become an "all-
embracing" organisation with the patent aspiration to become the locomotive of
European political integration and which, as it is known, does not only require
democracy and respect of human rights as a precondition for accession to it, but also
extends this requirement to the establishment of any institutional relation between a
non-member state and the organisation.9 It g es without saying that such a
precondition for admission to these two European/Atlantic mechanisms, which are
considered by the former communist states as the most desirable goals for realising
their European vision, is a crucial incentive for the populations of the East to
invigorate their efforts for a speedy transition to full democracy.
The Protection of Minorities
While all Europeans, almost without exception, agree that democracy and respect for
human rights are paramount values, which must be observed sacrosanctly, the same
does not apply with regard to a pan-European protection of minorities. Although there
is wide acceptance that one of the main sources of unrest and instability in certain
parts of Europe is the existence of minorities which are not satisfied with the way
majorities behave towards them; and, furthermore, that a better understanding of
minority problems, and satisfaction of their legitimate expectations could reduce the
risks of unpleasant political developments, Europeans do not seem to be bold enough
to propose measures of effective international control.
We are not, of course, today at the stage of what I referred to earlier as the « benign
neglect » that existed fifteen years ago with regard to minorities’ claims. But what has
                                                 
9 See, interalia, Part B: Explanatory statement of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Security and
Defence Policy Report (prepared by Y. Roubatis).  A4-0000/98.  A major development in the field of
protection of human rights by the European Union is the preparation of a Charter of Fundamental
Rights, which seems to be designed to become the main constitutive document of protection of human
rights in the Europe of 15.  Its preparation being in process, no concrete information exists with regard
to its final form and its legal force and its linkage to the European Convention on Human Rights and
the European Court of Human Rights.
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been produced over the last ten years with regard to their international protection is
inadequate if compared to the actual demands of most of the minorities and to the
threats that the minorities’ dissatisfaction may represent to European security. The
institutional achievements during the nineties are limited to one European framework
agreement on the protection of national minorities, adopted by states of the Council of
Europe and one agreement on minority languages.10 These two agreements contain
provisions codifying the main rules on the protection of minorities that had been
shaped by the international community in the interwar period and also develop new
rules enshrining the rights of minorities to greater autonomy within the state in which
they live, the assistance of the states for the attainment of their goals to preserve their
identity and discerning features and the ability of individuals to determine themselves
as belonging to a certain minority group. Against that background, it is expected that
minorities enjoying the rights provided for by these conventions, will be prepared to
renounce any claim to secede from the state concerned, and express their loyalty to
the state in which they live.
It is indeed indisputable, and it is expressly made so in the text of the agreements, that
these rights may be exercised by the minorities and that the states should abide by
them, as a « compromise » in exchange for the abandon by the minorities of any claim
to external self-determination. In other words, the protection of minorities has been
traded off with the right of a state to its territorial integrity and political
independence.11
What is still missing in the new institutional framework concerning protection of
minorities is a real and effective international mechanism of protection : a mechanism
of implementation and supervision. Unlike the protection of human rights where, as
we have already seen, the substantive rules are coupled with international mechanisms
designed to follow closely respect for the rules, in the field of minorities protection,
                                                 
10 See Hartig. H., “Elaboration de la convention cadre dans le contexte des travaux du Conseil de
l’Europe en matière de protection des minorités” Bredimas. A., Sicili nos. A.L., The Protection of
Minorities, (Athens: Sakkoulas, 1997); Kovacs, P. “La protection des langues des minorités ou la
nouvelle approche de la protection des minorités?” 97 Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public,
pp. 411 et seq (1997).
11 See the Preamble and Articles 20 and 21 of the European Convention on National Minorities.
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respect is left solely to the states concerned.12 This fact undoubtedly weakens an
effective implementation of the relevant obligations. It also shows how Europeans are
still hesitant to allow foreign states and authorities to interfere with minority matters
within the territory of their own state.13 It is an indication of a state of mind that gives
rise to certain misgivings, particularly today as our world is witnessing the tragic
events taking place on our doorstep in the Balkans; misgivings that are further
underpinned by clear evidence that in Europe intolerance, racism and xenophobia
have assumed worrying dimensions. What gives cause for concern is that the
hesitations of European states to protect their minorities more efficiently reflect a
rather widespread reticence in their societies to accept all the consequences that
egalitarianism in a multicultural structure of a state implies. And since the protection
of minorities is not simply a matter of adequate or inadequate legal texts but is heavily
interwoven in the everyday life of the societies within which these minorities live,
negative social behaviour may be influential to any legal efforts to sustain minority
rights; and vice versa. It is undeniable that the problem of minorities is a complex
socio-political and economic problem that is not limited to the satisfaction of the
minorities insofar as their rights of distinctiveness are concerned, but goes beyond
that, to the ability of a society to incorporate within its boundaries all of the elements
making up its human resources. It is also undeniable that legal texts effectively
protecting minorities and effectively applied by the state itself have a direct
pedagogical impact upon the way that the given society within that state perceives the
treatment of the minorities living therein.
                                                 
12 We are, of course, referring to the European Convention on Human Rights which, as we have seen,
provides for a rigid system of judicial protection and settlement of disputes. Unlike this convention, the
European Convention on National Minorities or the European Charter for Regional and Minority
Languages do not provide for a compulsory system of settlement of disputes or examination of
individual complaints.
13 The reticence of Europeans to allow international protection of minorities can be easily witnessed not
only through the absence of international (European) mechanisms of protection, but also, from the very
slow pace in the ratification of the two basic conventions, referred to in previous notes.  As an example,
albeit not a typical one (because of the peculiarity of the French legal system on minority issues) is the
decisions taken by the Conseil Constitutionnel on the question of the ratification of the European
Charter for Regional and Minority Rights, and more particularly on the question of the compatibility of
Christos Rozakis
10
Humanitarian Intervention
Our discussion up to now has been limited to an enumeration of the means through
which Europe has attempted to absorb the great shock created by the fall of the
communist regimes in the field of democratisation and protection of human rights. All
these are peaceful, non-forcible means of integration, limiting the sovereignty of the
states involved on the basis of their consent to such limitations. Yet the history of
transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the nineties is not fashioned only by
consensual, peaceful moves of the states concerned. In exceptional circumstances, it is
true, forcible, non-peaceful means have been employed against recalcitrant states
massively violating elementary human rights in Europe. We are basically, of course,
referring to the case of Yugoslavia where in two instances, in Bosnia in 1995 and in
Kosovo in 1999, the United Nations in the first instance, NATO in the second,
intervened in order to impose a solution to terminate massive violations of human
rights and to curtail conflictual relations threatening international peace and security.14
The second instance, that of Kosovo, presents a greater interest than the first one,
Bosnia, in that NATO intervened with military forces, on humanitarian grounds,
without any concrete decision of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and without an invitation from the sovereign state specifically calling for
assistance.15 We are hence confronted here with a situation which, although not totally
new, is of an unprecedented magnitude on our continent.16
                                                                                                                                
the Charter with the French Constitution.  See 93 American Journal of International Law pp.83 et seq
(1999).
14 The literature on the Yugoslav crisis is already immense.  See, inter alia, for documentation of the
critical moments of the crisis: Weller, H. (ed.) International Documents and Analysis, Vol. 1: The
Crisis in Kosovo, 1989-1999 : From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of
Hostilities; Vol. 2, The Kosovo Conflict:Conduct and Termination of Hostilities and the Renewed
Search for Settlement (Great Eversden: Cambridge, 1999).
15 There is no formal explanation on the part of NATO of the legal grounds on which the aerial
campaign against Yugoslavia took place.  Discussions within NATO circles or of a doctrinal nature
have shown a clear preference for justifying the campaign as a result of a threat to international peace
and security posed by the Yugoslav treatment of the Albanian minority in Kosovo, and as a
humanitarian intervention.  See, again amidst a vast literature, Valticos N. “Les droits de l’homme, le
droit international et l’intervention militaire en Yougoslavie”, Revue Générale de Droit International
Public, 5 et seq (2000 - 1); also the very interesting editorial comments of Henkin L. Wedgwood R.,
Charney J.I., Clinkin, Ch.M., Falk R.A., Franck, T.M., Reisman, W.M., in 93 American Journal of
International Law 824 et seq (1999).
16 Indeed in the European context military intervention in the last part of the twentieth century is
limited to two instances : the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia (1968).
Both incidents were justified by the USSR as responses to requests by the governments of the states
concerned.
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It is indisputable that the Kosovo affair - as was the case previously with Bosnia - has
been seen as a matter of international concern for the protection of human rights.  The
tandem “threat to international peace and security” and “humanitarian intervention”
has been used interchangeably to justify the military action. There does not seem to
exist any incompatibility with regard to the cumulative or alternative use of these
terms.  Indeed the proponents of the military campaign in Kosovo supported the idea
that the activities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the Albanian
minority living there (as a local majority), by committing gross violations of human
rights of the Albanian population, constituted a threat to international peace and
security, which justified the intervention of the international community; and that the
military intervention could be identified as a humanitarian intervention insofar as it
primarily served the protection of human rights of the Albanian population. Yet, one
may also consider that in the minds of those who intervened, the humanitarian aspect
stricto sensu was not the only element that justified intervention. There is n  question
that concern was expressed in some quarters that international peace and security was
not only threatened by the violation of human rights perpetrated by Yugoslav military
and paramilitary forces; but that it was also threatened by the generally aggressive
behaviour of the Yugoslav government, which was attempting to impose Serbian rule
in the area of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, causing a serious problem to
other ethnic populations and a potential redistribution of the demographic balance in
the Balkans. The  repercussions of a massive exodus of Albanians from Kosovo - and
later on of other ethnic groups living in the new Yugoslav state - could have been
extremely dangerous for the geopolitical stability of the area. The possible
involvement of other neighbouring states in the problem could easily have ended up in
an interminable international conflict and resulted in the spreading of instability in the
area.
Despite the linkage made by the proponents of intervention with the UN principles it
is difficult to contend that the military campaign of NATO was lawful.  Criteria which
have been enunciated as distinguishing features legitimising these armed activities
have not convinced the majority of international lawyers and the public opinion of the
various countries involved that the major impediment to legality, namely the absence
of UN Security Council authorisation under Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter
was overcome.  The arguments that the Security Council was blocked, because of the
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veto; that the international community had to act despite the blockage; that the NATO
activity was not the result of the whim of one state, but collective measures taken by a
regional organisation; that the campaign was not prohibited by the Charter because it
did not contravene the Article 2 (4) conditions - it did not violate the territorial
integrity and the political independence of Yugoslavia -; that the UN did not oppose
and eventually endorsed ex post facto the NATO actions, all had their merits but did
not meet the strict requirements of the UN Charter. After all, this is the main reason
which led a number of international lawyers to propose either legislative changes of a
major or minor character to the requirements of the Charter, or a careful delimitation
of the boundaries of this intervention in order for it to be considered as an exception
to the prohibitive rule on military intervention, not authorised by the Security
Council.17
In any event the international community was faced - and is still faced - with a basic
problem of successfully balancing the primordial values of the post-cold war world
order: the value of the territorial integrity and political independence of states and the
prohibition of the use of force as enshrined in the UN Charter on the one hand and the
value of the protection of human rights as a matter of international concern, which
may justify actions taken by the community against a perpetrator on the other. The
law as it now stands does not always offer a bold answer to the protection of the latter
value. And it does not offer an answer because the procedures provided for by the UN
Charter -an international constitution drafted under totally different political
circumstances than the present ones- do not allow an effective interference of this
organisation, through the use of force, in the domestic affairs of a state that allegedly
violates fundamental human rights of people living within its jurisdiction. The
virtually exclusive competence (primary responsibility) of the Security Council in
matters of undertaking or authorising collective use of force, either through its
auspices or through actions of a regional organisation, is the core issue; since a
decision of the UN to intervene with military force does not solely require the
majority vote of the members of the Security Council, but also unanimity of the
permanent members. Although in some recent situations such a majority did in fact
become possible, in the Yugoslav situation it was still impossible to attain. Div rging
                                                 
17 See, inter alia, the proposals made by the writers of the editorial comments in the A erican Journal
of International Law (op cit, note 15)
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views among the permanent members of the Security Council -Russia and China
were, it appears, against UN action in Yugoslavia- led NATO to proceed with the
campaign; its member states did not even try to raise the issue before the Security
Council, being of the conviction that its discussion would result in an impasse,
making intervention more difficult and politically more reprehensible.18
The Kosovo affair clearly demonstrates the major changes occurring in the
international order with regard to the protection of human rights. Although the
concept of humanitarian intervention is, by no means, a new one, its application in
Yugoslavia bears certain features that make it distinguishable from the traditional
picture that lawyers have in mind when they refer to it: first and foremost the military
campaign in Yugoslavia was not intended either to protect citizens of the intervening
state (as an ultimate refuge of diplomatic protection) or to promote their national
interests ; its main, irrefutable goal was to safeguard the rights of the Albanian
minority and maintain international peace and security.19 Secondl , it was an action of
a regional organisation, of the kind provided for by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
and not an action by a state or a group of states of the unorganised international
community.20 Moreover this regional organisation is composed of a number of states
which are influential in international relations (and, hence, their role in international
                                                 
18 NATO’s members who were at the same time members of the UN Security Council considered that
submission of a request for military intervention to Yugoslavia was a futile exercise given the
indications that they had with regard to the position of Russia and China on this matter.  Indeed Russia
and China, during the discussions in the Security Council of the measures against Yugoslavia, had
indicated that they were against any use of force - including use of force to protect the OSCE verifiers.
Three days after the beginning of the campaign Belarus, India and Russia prepared a draft resolution
claiming that the NATO bombing violated Articles 2(4), 24 and 53 of the UN Charter (UN Doc.
S/1999/328, March 26, 1999).
19 For a further discussion on this matter see, again, the editorial comments in the American Journal of
International Law (op cit., note 15).
20 Chapter VIII in its Article 53(2) provides that “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence
of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional actions, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations”. NATO clearly comes under the definition provided for by the Charter, but this does
not automatically make it able to undertake military action such as provided for by Chapter VII of the
Charter; since para 2 of Article 53 provides that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council”. As
Wedgwood says (op cit, p. 832, note 21) “Many commentators disputed this reading of the uncertain
text, since it suffers the hazard that Council authorisation will not be forthcoming. A choice of
interpretation may depend on one’s attitude toward legal ambiguity in international affairs, and relative
confidence that a frequently stymied Council can preserve an adequate framework of security.”
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law-making is of particular importance)21, i luding three out of five of the permanent
members of the UN Security Council. It should finally be added that the military
activity took place in Europe, had as a target a European state, had as its aim to
protect European citizens and the European states that are Yugoslavia’s neighbours,
and was conducted by Western states, who were in their majority European states.
These elements and more particularly the last one, may answer to a certain extent
criticisms coming from various quarters on the selectivity of NATO’s intervention in
Yugoslavia. The intervention was, of course, selective, but its selectivity was founded
on discernible grounds: that the human rights violations and the humanitarian outrages
had occurred in a region of the world with a high degree of sensitivity in matters of
human rights protection and with a concern for the maintenance of political and social
stability, whose undermining could have adverse consequences for the whole
continent. One may reach the sad conclusion that, under these circumstances, the
situation is dissimilar to that, e.g. of Rwanda or even to that of Chechnya, both from a
conceptual and a strategic point of view.22  It is obvious that despite the importance
given to the universality of human rights and its protection, some areas of the world
benefit less than others from that international concern.
The re-entry of the concept of humanitarian intervention into the human rights
discourse is a development, which cannot, and should not, be underestimated.  It is, of
course, commonplace today that NATO’s campaign clearly overstepped the
boundaries of lawfulness under positive international law. Even the most fervent
proponents of the intervention hesitate to discard summarily the accusations of
illegality; and make efforts either to interpret the existing law from a different angle
                                                 
21 All states are, of course, equal before the law and they all equally participate in the international law-
making through their practice (coupled with their opinio juris) and their participation in international
conventions.  Yet, it is obvious that some States, because of a number of factors, influence heavily the
law-making by their acts or omissions. This is the case of, at least, the three States, permanent members
of the Security Council, who, at the same time, constituted the hard core of NATO’s interventionist
forces.
22 With regard to Chechnya there are probably more reasons which justify the positive discrimination
that the traditional Western powers have adopted vis-à-vis Russia.  One weighty element in their
distinct approach to the matter may be the powerful posture of Russia in international relations.  But
apart from this, there may also be the need of the former powers to see to it that Russia becomes
gradually integrated in the European mainstream.  It seems that the European States and the USA
consider that Russia merits different treatment because it is manifesting, unlike the Milosevitch regime,
a will to develop structures and policies consistent with those of the other European States. The
strategic factor is also one which must have influenced European States and the USA to apply a
different policy in Chechnya; this factor also embraces the consideration that Chechnya cannot have the
same repercussions that Yugoslavia had on the stability of the European continent.
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than the orthodox one, or to raise the ethical issue that apathy vis-à-vis such gross
violations of human rights would be catastrophic for the world order.  But it is also
undeniable that the Kosovo affair has provoked a new discussion on the ability of the
international system to cope with human rights violations of a grand scale. Once again
states have found a motive for reappraising the workability of the present Security
Council structure and the need for more flexible and operational mechanisms on a
global and regional scale to deal with matters of protection of human rights.  In
Europe this discussion remains vivid, and it has been further enhanced by two other
incidents which have occurred in the meantime: the Pinochet case and the sanctions of
the European Union against Austria.23 It is apparent that the accumulation of these
events, if seen microscopically together with the creation of the single European Court
of Human Rights and the preparation of the new European Charter of Fundamental
Rights, demonstrate the intense interest of pan-European states in gradually creating a
uniform, constitutional order on the continent, overcoming the hurdles of national
frontiers and of sovereignty and establishing a regional order of protection on a large
scale.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to depict the central role that human rights are playing in
this transitional period in Europe. With few, notorious exceptions, European states
seem to be prepared to abide by human rights norms and to align their domestic legal
orders with the precepts deriving from the various European texts in force.
At the same time, the international mechanisms operating within the European
borders function both at the level of assisting the former communist states to speed up
their transition to democracy and at the level of monitoring and sanctioning,
sometimes with binding force, deviations from the orthodoxy of human rights’
respect. The same cannot be said with regard to the protection of minorities, which
                                                 
23 The Pinochet case antedates the Kosovo intervention: General Pinochet was arrested in London by
British authorities on the 16th October 1998 after a Spanish magistrate issued an international warrant
seeking his detention (See Murphy, S. “Contemporary Practice of the United States”, 93 American
Journal of International Law 487, et seq. (1999); but the proceedings concerning his extradition to
Spain continued throughout the period of the campaign and thereafter. The sanctions of the European
Union against Austria are more recent and started to apply during this year, after the election in Aust ia
which brought to power a political coalition of the parties of the right and the extreme right wing.
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although it is at the core of the problem of European stability and integration, has
been treated by the majority of states with reluctance. This latter phenomenon comes
as a sharp contrast to the readiness of Europeans to intervene forcibly within the
domestic order of a third state for the latter’s maltreatment of a minority, while they
are themselves not prepared to allow non-forcible, consensual control of their
behaviour vis-à-vis their own minorities through the intermediary of an agreement.
In any event, it appears that the overriding need for European integration and the
willingness of the former communist states to join, as soon as possible, the process of
this integration have upgraded the protection of human rights to a paramount priority.
Human rights in Europe are not, in any way, any longer merely a domestic matter for
its states. State sovereignty is no longer a sanctuary protecting the authorities from
international decisions denouncing their failure to respect human rights. It seems that
human rights have become so much intertwined, in the minds of Europeans, with the
ideas of integration, unification, stability and security that it is difficult for them to
become disentangled and separated out. Despite the difficulties that their final
achievement may entail, this equation is a success for Europe and a great leap forward
for the whole of humanity.
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